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Abstract This paper explores a wide range of cross-country determinants of
life satisfaction exploiting a database of 90,000 observations in 70 countries.
We distinguish four groups of aggregate variables as potential determinants
of satisfaction: political, economic, institutional, and human development and
culture. We use ordered probit to investigate the importance of these vari-
ables on individual life satisfaction and test the robustness of our results with
ExtremeBoundsAnalysis. The results show that only a small number of factors,
such as openness, business climate, postcommunism, the number of chambers
in parliament, Christian majority, and infant mortality, robustly influence life
satisfaction across countries while the importance of many variables suggested
in the previous literature is not confirmed. This remains largely true when the
analysis splits national populations according to gender, income, and political
orientation also.
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1 Introduction
Although the literature on the economics of happiness is relatively new, it
has already attracted substantial attention both within academia and, more
recently, in political discussions. This increasing attention, not least that of pol-
icymakers, raises the pressure for generating robust findings and thereby valid
implications. One part of the existing literature has concentrated on exploring
individual-level determinants of life satisfaction, while another part analyzes
country-specific determinants of satisfaction across states. Clearly, however,
happiness research is still to come of age. As Diener and Seligman (2004, p. 3)
in their comprehensive survey of the happiness literature note, “a much more
systematic approach is needed in order to provide leaders with the best possible
well-being indicators.” That exactly is the aim of this paper.
As noted, part of the literature explores the determinants of life satisfaction
at the individual level. In this part, there is fairly broad consensus on the main
determinants of well-being and they are remarkably similar across countries
(see, e.g., Oswald 1997; Frey and Stutzer 2002; Diener and Seligman 2004; Hayo
2004). First of all, higher relative income or socio-economic status increases
well-being according to virtually all studies. Second, higher levels of education
also tend to be positively associated with life satisfaction. Third, being unem-
ployed exerts a strongly negative influence on individual well-being that cannot
be alleviated to any substantial degree by the social security net. Life satisfaction
depends, fourth, non-linearly on age with satisfaction roughly decreasing until
people reach their mid-40 s after which satisfaction increases again. Fifth, social
capital in its different dimensions is conducive to life satisfaction (Helliwell
2003; Bjørnskov 2003). Sixth, religiosity or spirituality is often found to be a
significant factor of well-being (e.g., Clark and Lelkes 2005). Finally, family
status is a strong predictor of individual life satisfaction. Marriage is positively
associated with happiness, and having children may also be so, although cau-
sality is not yet entirely clear (cf. Frey and Stutzer 2006). Not only is there
broad consensus that these variables robustly affect well-being, the literature
also stresses that their impact on life satisfaction is remarkably similar across
countries (e.g., Hayo 2004).
Conversely, the second strand of the literature attempts to explain cross-
country differences by either adding aggregate variables to the micro-model or
by analyzing average happiness at the country level. Here, researchers are far
from being close to reaching consensus as to which variables are important for
well-being. The exception is national income, which is significantly associated
with overall life satisfaction until countries reach an average income of approx-
imately 10,000 USD, after which income seizes to be important (Schyns 1998;
Frey and Stutzer 2002). Many aggregate variables have been proposed to be
major determinants of well-being in some studies, but have been reported to be
insignificant in others. Examples are macro-economic factors like volatility of
growth and inflation rates, institutional and political factors such as democracy
and economic freedom, structure and scope of government, and cultural factors
like social capital and gender equality. There is also some discussion about the
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impact ofwelfare state characteristics like social spending and income inequality
(e.g., Veenhoven 2000a; Bjørnskov et al. 2007; both contrasting Layard 2006).
What can we learn from the previous literature? Clearly, there is a gap in
this literature on the importance of country-level determinants of life satisfac-
tion, as many authors do not show sufficient care in examining the sensitivity
of their empirical findings with respect to the inclusion of additional variables
to their regressions. As a consequence, it is hard to tell whether the reported
significances in a particular regression are really trustworthy and the variables
are robustly related to life satisfaction.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. We, therefore, analyze to what extent
cross-country aggregate economic, political, institutional, and human develop-
mental variables that have been suggested in the literature as influencing life
satisfaction are indeed robust determinants. We use Extreme Bounds Analysis
(EBA) to do this.1
Another gap in the happiness literature is the narrow focus of most of the
empirical analyses on entire national populations. Arguably, there is reason to
expect that the impact of country-level determinants examined varies between
different subpopulations and socio-demographic characteristics. How do eco-
nomic, political, institutional andhumandevelopmental factors affect subjective
life satisfaction in different social groups? This is the second question our paper
deals with. For this purpose, we use individual World Values Survey data of 70
countries and explore whether 54 different aggregate factors exert differential
influence on (a) people in low, middle, and high income groups, (b) men and
women, and (c) people voting to the left or the right of the middle, respectively.
Our approach of splitting the population into different groups has major
advantages over previous studies: if some factors affect, for example, average
life satisfaction of only one particular group in society, estimating its effect on
the entire populationwill tend to bias the coefficient and its significance towards
zero and thus disguise its actual importance. Splitting by subgroups, however,
also allows the impacts of remaining individual and aggregate determinants to
vary between these groups, compared to the inclusion of one interaction term
with the variable of interest. Again, we explore the robustness of our results to
the inclusion of additional variables using Extreme Bounds Analysis.
We follow Helliwell (2003) in combining individual-level World Values Sur-
vey data with variables aggregated at the country level, implicitly assuming that
levels of life satisfaction are comparable across individuals.2 While all regres-
sions in our study thus always include individual-level variables, the focus of
the robustness tests is on the macro-level cross-country findings reported in
the previous literature. On the one hand, aggregate factors are more subject
1 The EBA includes additional variables to the regression model and analyzes the entire distribu-
tion of estimates for the variables of interest. It is frequently used to test the robustness of empirical
results in the recent literature (see, e.g., Fernández et al. 2001; Sturm and de Haan 2005; Sturm
et al. 2005). We explain the method in some detail below.
2 In principle, replies to questions as the one used in this paper are of an ordinal nature and
thus may not be reliably comparable across individuals. Nevertheless, there is ample literature
supporting this approach (see, e.g., Ng 1997).
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to discretion of politicians providing a lever to improving people’s well-being,
while, on the other hand, individual determinants of life satisfaction have been
shown to be quite robust across different countries, economic conditions and
political systems.
We continue as follows. Section 2 presents our hypotheses. The methodology
and data are described in Sect. 3 while Sect. 4 presents the empirical results.
Section 5 presents and discusses our main results while Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Hypotheses
As noted in the introduction, a large number of cross-country factors have
been suggested as determinants of life satisfaction. In order to investigate the
influence of those aggregate factors on self-reported well-being across various
societal groups, ourmodel of life satisfaction combines both aggregate and indi-
vidual level determinants. The hypotheses discussed below, however, will focus
only on country-level determinants of well-being. Due to space restraints, the
discussion will mostly refer to their impact on the whole population rather than
that on societal sub-groups, although our empirical analysis presents additional
findings for samples split according to income, gender or political orientation,
and provides explanations for differential impacts.3
Our hypotheses can loosely be allocated to four broad sets of explanatory
factors under the headings of political, economic, institutional and, respectively,
human development as described below.4
2.1 Political factors
Political factors clearly affect peoples’ lives and should thus be important deter-
minants of individual life satisfaction across nations. In particular, not only (1)
the political system, but also (2) the ideology and structure of the ruling gov-
ernment, as well as (3) specific historical experiences such as regime changes
can arguably influence well-being. These political factors influence the extent
to which the current allocation of goods and resources is in line with people’s
preferences. They equally determine whether and to what extent politicians are
responsive to their citizens, which societal groups are favored or disfavored, and
whether conflicting interests are integrated. Finally, political factors influence
what people expect at least economically from the future, thereby contributing
to people’s well-being.
Specifically, based on theoretical political economy models we expect stron-
ger democratic institutions to lead to an allocation of goods and resources closer
3 Economists in happiness research rarely analyze potentially differential impacts of macro-level
determinants by gender. As one exception, Fischer and Rodriguez (2006) investigate the impact of
political institutions on male and female suicide rates.
4 Appendix A reports descriptive statistics.
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to citizens’ preferences, implying higher individual well-being.5 It has also been
argued that people in older democracies are happier than those in younger
democracies, as in the latter democratic institutions do not exist long enough
to induce substantial policy changes, or because people in transition countries
developed overly optimistic expectations which, then, have not been fulfilled
by the new regime (Dorn et al. 2006). Similarly, in analogy to political economy
models of federalism we argue that countries’ independence could increase
life satisfaction as ‘local’ individual preferences are more respected than under
‘distanced’ foreign rule.6 Furthermore, gaining independence entails the often
utilized opportunity to eliminate ingrained, unresponsive power structures and
remnants of undemocratic systems, as the recent experience of postcommunist
Eastern Europe exemplifies. This reasoning leads to the following hypotheses:
1. Countries’ degree and age of democracy increases life satisfaction of their
citizens.
2. A history of independence is conducive to citizens’ well-being.
Regarding ideology and structure of governments, Bauman (1998) argues that
shifts towards the political right immiserize the poor as redistributive measures
are restrained (even though the overall effect on personal well-being depends
on individual political leaning). Greater government fractionalization has been
claimed to lead to excessive growth in governments’ budgets and exploitation
of the tax base as a ‘fiscal commons’, thereby shrinking people’s net income
for their own consumption.7 Fractionalization is also said to substantially slow
down political decision-making processes as compromises have to be sought
(e.g., Bawn 1999; Ganghof 2003). While this would suggest fractionalization to
reduce well-being, participation of a greater number of parties in the political
process increases representation of smaller societal groups, potentially benefit-
ing from pork-barrel legislation and log-rolling (see Lijphart 1977).8 We thus
hypothesize:
3. Right-wing political ideology is detrimental to life satisfaction of the poor.
4. Fractionalization reduces well-being; alternatively:
5. Fractionalization increases well-being.
Bicameral legislatures potentially increase the number of veto-players in polit-
ical systems that can block policy changes, like changes related to the reduction
5 See Downs (1957), Fernández et al. (2001), Beck et al. (2001) for theoretical models of democ-
racy; for empirical support of higher responsiveness to the median voter’s preferences see, e.g.,
Pommerehne (1978) and Gerber (1996, 1999); for the beneficial impact of citizen empowerment on
well-being see Frey and Stutzer (2000) and Dorn et al. (2006).
6 See the models in, e.g., Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Oates (1972), Bardhan (1997), andHayek
(1939).
7 See Roubini and Sachs (1989), de Haan and Sturm (1997), Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999),
Volkerink and de Haan (2001).
8 However, see Weingast et al. (1981), Tullock (1981), and Besley and Coate (1997, 1998) on
inefficiencies created by such a representative political system.
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of government spending.9 Depending on the status quo, various societal groups
will be affected differently by political stability, i.e., by maintaining the current
political, economic, and social situation.10 Regarding monarchy, a common
positive trait of European constitutional monarchies as well as absolutist rulers
in mostly Arab countries is that the monarch as head of state exerts unifying
and stabilizing forces bridging ethnic fractionalization and differences in party
ideologies either as a positive rolemodel or as an object of the hatred of his own
people (Bjørnskov 2005).11 Finally, people in postcommunist states experience
a hard time of social and economic disorder during their ongoing transition
processes, reducing today’s life satisfaction and even enhancing their tendency
to glorify the more socially stable ‘good old days.’ Moreover and analogously
to the ‘age of democracy’ hypothesis, compared to countries with well-estab-
lished democratic governing bodies, people residing in formerly communist
states experience political institutions still under development (Heston et al.
2002; Teksoz and Sanfey 2005; Dorn et al. 2006).12 The foregoing analysis leads
to the following hypotheses:
6. Bicameralism decreases well-being.
7. Citizens living in monarchies are more satisfied with their lives.
8. People in post-communist countries are less satisfied with their lives.
2.2 Economic factors
The state of the economy might equally contribute to an individual’s life satis-
faction. In general, as main economic determinants of well-being the literature
proposes (1) absolute levels and variety of private and public goods consump-
tion, (2) an individual’s relative income position, or (3) expectations about
future income streams. From a purely economic point of view, higher levels of
any of these three factors should raise individual well-being.
Turning to the first point, consumption possibilities may depend on the level
of personal income, a country’s openness to trade, and government provision
of public goods. More specifically, individual income is a source of well-being
according to almost all standard economic theories.13 Moreover, openness to
9 See the theoretical models in Romer and Rosenthal (1978) and Tsebelis (1995); see Bawn (1999),
McCubbins (1991) and Alt and Lowry (1994) for empirical evidence.
10 Traditionally, however, bicameralism with its checks and balances has been viewed more posi-
tively and thought to prevent tyranny of a simple majority (or even minority) in legislation, thereby
providing political and social stability (e.g., König 2001).
11 Bjørnskov (2005) finds that monarchies have substantially more trusting populations, suggesting
that the monarch exerts such a unifying effect on society. For a list of monarchist countries, see
http://www.cosmoedu.net/politicalscience.html#monarchies (18 May 2005).
12 Yet, communism as suchmay also have left indelible long-term changes in individual norms, atti-
tudes and risk perceptions that affect life satisfaction (cf. Bjørnskov 2005), making it an important
cultural factor.
13 A positive impact of current or lagged GDP on ‘happiness’ was found in DiTella et al. (2003).
However, virtually no study reports an impact of national income on life satisfaction in countries
where the majority of the population have their basic needs covered.
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trade and globalization might imply higher welfare due to lower international
price levels and greater variety of goods, both implying an increased ability to
make purchases closer to one’s preferences (Lancaster 1980; Dixit and Stiglitz
1977).14
Consumption possibilities are also influenced by governments which provide,
aside from private goods, also important public goods such as education and
infrastructure. These goods do not only affect today’s bundle of consumption
goods, but also provide the basis for future economic prosperity. Moreover,
expansion of government production into particular areas might lower ineffi-
ciencies in private consumption due to consumers’ bounded rationality, leading
to excessive consumerism, for example as in (Ng 2003). Yet, on the other hand,
governments and public administrations do not have full information on cit-
izens’ preferences, and bureaucrats and administrators have been shown to
seek rents and maximize their budgets beyond the point of optimality, so that
more government spending decreases overall well-being (e.g., Niskanen 1975;
Bjørnskov et al. 2007). We thus hypothesize:
9. GDP per capita increases well-being.
10. Globalization increases well-being.
11. Government consumption increases well-being; alternatively:
12. Government consumption reduces well-being.
As a second group of economic factors, the actual degree of income inequal-
ity and related redistributive government policies might well affect personal
socio-economic positions and perceived fairness of the allocation of resources
in society. First, the degree of income inequality affects the relative income
position of individuals and might thus influence their well-being. While a num-
ber of individual-level studies have shown that personal income distance to a
comparison group matters for happiness (e.g., Fox and Kahneman 1992), the
direction of its impact on people with income below the median, however,
is not obvious a priori. Comparably poor people might be negatively influ-
enced by inequality when envy prevails, yet greater income inequality could
also entail greater opportunities. In particular, poor people in unequal, but
dynamic societies might expect to increase their income over time, while the
chances of escaping poverty are smaller when all are equally poor. Regarding
life satisfaction of people with above median income the impact of inequality
is also indeterminate and depends on the relative strengths of two opposing
effects: The positive feeling of being in a comparably good social position and
14 See Dreher (2006a,b) for a summary, and an empirical test of how globalization affects eco-
nomic policy and, respectively, economic growth. However, globalization also produces losers in
those economic sectors with a comparative disadvantage (e.g., Bauman 1998), who might expe-
rience declining income (Dixit and Norman 1980). Traditionally, low-skilled workers are among
the losers in industrial countries, whereas they are among the winners in developing or transition
countries. Furthermore, globalization might also increase uncertainty, and, finally, might reversely
impact individuals’ relative income position (Dreher and Gaston 2006), thus decreasing subjective
well-being.
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the fear of becoming forcefully deprived by those worse off.15 In any case, we
expect to observe different impacts of income inequality between low income
and high income groups. Overall we hypothesize:
13. Inequality reduces well-being; alternatively:
14. Inequality increases well-being.
A similar interpretation potentially applies to welfare transfers and sub-
sidies and the top marginal tax rate as measures of the welfare system and
progressivity of income taxes. If welfare payments and income redistribution
via the tax system are correctly targeted according to their stated goals, they
should decrease income inequality and raise disposable income of the needy. In
consequence, such government activities might reduce distributional conflicts
between societal groups and so lead to less crime, enhancing the well-being of
all members of society alike. Also, persons with a leftist ideology should be
more in favor of redistributive measures (for theory and empirical evidence,
see Alesina et al. 2004).16 If, however, social mobility is perceived as high,
(potential) welfare recipients might even fear the costs of redistribution more
than they value its benefits. On the other hand, higher marginal tax and welfare
payments might also be linked to wasteful government spending, making all
equally worse off (Bjørnskov et al. 2007). Finally, access to technology might
reversely impact individuals’ perceived income position by changing their ref-
erence groups and thus decreasing their well-being (Bruni and Stanca 2006).17
This discussion implies the following hypotheses:
15. Redistribution reduces well-being; alternatively:
16. Redistribution increases well-being.
17. Access to technology reduces well-being.
As noted above, economic instability is arguably associated with lower life
satisfaction as it negatively affects people’s expectations about their future
position (Graham and Pettinato 2001). Economic uncertainty is generated by
fluctuations in overall business climate and economic cycles—reflected byGDP
growth, public debt, unemployment, and inflation.
Clearly, economic uncertainty and instability may lead to financial and psy-
chological costs for all groups in society alike, as all might be subject to its
adverse consequences. However, a high unemployment rate might for some
15 Living in a dynamic society and fear of property crime are among the explanations of the differ-
ential impact of inequality between income groups in the USA compared to European countries
(Alesina et al. 2004).
16 Income inequality and unemployment rates were shown to negatively affect only persons with
a leftist orientation, but not those being more conservative. Similarly, a robust positive influence of
a more generous unemployment benefit system on happiness is reported in DiTella et al. (2003).
17 However, taking into account the ‘homo ludens’ facet of human existence, access to modern
technology might equally raise people’s well-being as they have a new gadget to play with. This
aspect is often addressed through design features that are not determined by usability of the item
(e.g., fancy beeping sounds, extraterrestrial outlook, etc). We thank an anonymous referee for
hinting at this contrasting possibility.
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persons reflect a higher risk of becoming unemployed than for others.18 Most
likely, higher unemployment rates will exert the strongest negative effect on
low-skilled persons and female workers, as in many countries among our sam-
ple there is an oversupply of unskilled labor (at givenwage levels). Furthermore,
in times of recession women are often laid off faster than their male colleagues.
As regards GDP growth, higher growth rates imply future rises in personal
incomes which should be positive for all societal groups. Indeed, a positive
impact on happiness is reported in DiTella et al. (2003). The level of public
debt to GDP, however, can proxy for bad governance of politicians or an ongo-
ing recession which often gives reason to later increase tax rates and to cut
government spending on welfare, investments, infrastructure, and education.
Moderate growth thus to some extent measures expected future well-being,
while an overheating economy can generate economic upheavals and social
unrest. Finally, inflation reduces real income and devalues savings, probably
decreasing consumption and investment.19 Therefore:
18. Economic environments with stable and moderate growth increase well-
being.
2.3 Institutional factors
Institutions have also been proposed to affect life satisfaction (Helliwell 2006;
Ovaska andTakashima 2006). In general, institutions provide the setting for suc-
cessfulmarket transactions, and ensure the functioning of facilities and adminis-
trations; furthermore, they enhance coping with the difficulties of daily life and
provide (philosophical) guidelines for a better living. The various types of for-
mal and informal institutions, potentially important for well-being, relate to (1)
governance, (2) social interaction between citizens, and (3) quasi-exogenously
given cultural heritage, such as religion or ethnic diversity.
More specifically, aspects of good governance such as legal quality, the quality
of business regulations and the absence of corruption reduce enforcement costs
of law and make—according to economic models of crime (Becker 1968)—the
adherence to business and private contracts more likely. Thus, market transac-
tions are facilitated and economic uncertainty is reduced. Likewise, a free and
unrestrained press increases transparency and makes it easier for citizens to
control politicians and other important decision-makers in society. However,
unrestrainedmediamay also bemore likely to direct attention to adverse events
that could potentially create anxiety and thus decrease well-being. In sum, how-
ever, most of these aspects of formal institutions can arguably be expected to
positively affect life satisfaction. More specifically, the discussion implies:
19. Good governance and high quality of institutions increase well-being.
18 Graham and Pettinato (2001) find a strong negative effect of inflation and unemployment on
life satisfaction and explain this by economic uncertainty. Similarly, a negative impact of inflation
and unemployment is reported in DiTella et al. (2001, 2003).
19 Alesina et al. (2004) report inflation to reduce happiness in the USA and European countries.
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Regarding institutions that influence citizens’ interactions, we follow Putnam’s
(1993) seminal work, suggesting social capital, defined as trust, norms and net-
works, to affect life satisfaction positively (see also Bjørnskov 2003; Helliwell
2003). Apart from fostering social cohesion and connectedness, countries with
high levels of social capital are characterized bymore honest behavior in general
(e.g., Knack 2001)—factors that all should lead to more life satisfaction.20 Sim-
ilarly, a higher degree of confidence in governing structures and the decisions
of their representatives, captured by confidence in parliament, might influence
life satisfaction as people perceive formal institutions to be fair and effective.
We hypothesize:
20. Vertical and horizontal trust increase well-being.
Turning tomore exogenous, informal norms and institutions, religion is likely to
be important for peoples’ satisfaction with their lives (Keefer and Knack 2002).
Equally, differences in traditional informal institutions might well be reflected
by ethnic groups. Consequently, ethnic heterogeneity might well be linked with
social tensions between different societal groups, becoming manifest in occur-
rences of violent crime or even civil war, decreasing peoples’ well-being. Thus,
the prediction on the influence of ethnic diversity as clash of culture is clear-cut
and should be negative, while the effect of the share of various religious groups
on well-being might depend on their associated philosophy (e.g., Dorn et al.
2006). Therefore:
21. Ethnic diversity decreases well-being.
22. Religion affects well-being.
2.4 Human development and culture
Turning to dimensions of human development, potential determinants of the
quality of life include aspects such as the provision of public goods related to
health care, or access to education promising future higher income streams, dis-
crimination of women, as well as geographical factors. Finally, cultural values
might equally affect well-being.
First of all, infant mortality, life expectancy, and fertility are central and
objective measures of the quality of life. A more developed welfare state and
healthcare system should lead to an increase in longevity, lower infantmortality,
and a lower number of children.
Also, education in primary and secondary schools forms part of the quality
of human life. Missing education of children is linked to contemporary parental
poverty, on the one hand, but, on the other, is equally associated with jeopardiz-
ing the financial future for the child (and sometimes for the parents also). For
this reason, access to public education of children might be particularly impor-
tant for low-income families. Furthermore, schooling also makes people more
20 More recently, Uslaner (2002) and Bjørnskov (2005) have shown that these effects are entirely
due to generalized trust.
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informed about the state of society and the surrounding world which enables
them to better understand and assess potential risks and opportunities. This
ability arguably ought to clear away some uncertainty about the future course
of life.21 These considerations imply the following hypotheses:
23. Health (care) increases well-being.
24. Education increases well-being.
Gender discrimination (gender equality) might be expected to have a nega-
tive (positive) effect on individual life satisfaction, in particular on those of
women and persons with leftist ideology (Schyns 1998; Bjørnskov et al. 2006;
Veenhoven 2000b). However, given that the existence of discrimination induces
conflicts between genders, it could be equally well expected that the effects exist
for both sexes:22
25. Gender discrimination reduces well-being.
Arguably, geographical factors might also affect life satisfaction. Generally
speaking, a moderately warm and friendly climate could make people feel
more satisfied with their lives by, e.g., relieving them of the physical stress of
extreme temperatures. For this reason, people living in extreme cold or in the
desert may be less satisfied:
26. A moderate climate is conducive to life satisfaction.
Finally, Dorn et al. (2006) show that persons residing in predominantly English-
speaking countries systematically report higher levels of subjective happiness
than persons in other countries. This reflects either a different perception or
definition of ‘happiness’ in this culture or some British institutional character-
istics in former British colonies. Our final hypothesis is thus:
27. People in predominantly English-speaking countries are more satisfied
with their lives.
3 Method and data
Due to data restrictions and the relative invariance of observed levels of well-
being over time as compared to its variability across countries we estimate cross-
section regressions. Data on reported levels of life satisfaction and individual
control variables are taken from the World Values Survey (WVS) and cover
individuals in more than 70 countries over the period 1997–2000.23 Societal
21 However, being better informed may also reduce people’s chances of being happily ignorant.
22 It might well be that the absence of discrimination and complete discrimination constitute two
separate and stable equilibria between genders, whereas the existence of some discrimination is a
sign that society is on a painful transition path from one state to the other.
23 Note that the World Values Survey distinguishes ‘life satisfaction’ from ‘happiness’, which is
used in some of the studies cited here (e.g., Veenhoven 2000). The correlation between happiness
and satisfaction is surprisingly low (ρ = 0.44). The exact question we employ in this paper is: “All
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” A card was then
shown to the interviewee with a scale ranging from 1 (dissatisfied) to 10 (satisfied).
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groups are chosen based on either self-reported income levels (low, middle, and
high), gender, or political orientation. The full sample contains about 90,000
individuals, which is roughly divided in half by gender and drops to about
30,000 when dividing the sample according to ideology or income groups. Note
that—in particular — people reporting either left-wing or right-wing ideology
do not add up to the full sample—people without strong political views or those
not reporting their views are missing.
Our dependent variable, self-reported life satisfaction, is measured in the
WVS on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (com-
pletely satisfied). As a consequence, our empirical approach implicitly assumes
that categories of life satisfaction are—at least to a substantial degree—interper-
sonally comparable (for psycho-neurological justification, see, e.g., Ng 1997),
though avoiding to assume cardinality. Regarding the choice of explanatory
individual variables, we follow the previous literature (introduced above). The
aggregate variables are chosen so as to correspond to the hypotheses intro-
duced in the previous section. Table 1 shows the aggregate variables used to
test the hypotheses formulated above, their sources and corresponding hypoth-
eses while Appendix A provides descriptive statistics.
While most of the variables in Table 1 are straight forward, some may
need further explanation. To test our political and institutional hypotheses,
we employ, among others, a number of well-known democracy and governance
indicators, and a measure of political ideology.24 The ideology measure is intro-
duced in Bjørnskov (2005) and ranges from −1 to 1, with higher values reflect-
ing more right-wing governments. By averaging over a decade, this indicator
is likely to reflect both government ideology itself as well as real, ideologically
determined policy changes. Fractionalization is measured employing the Her-
findahl index of the legislature, which is calculated as the sum of squared shares
of seats in parliament held by any government party.
Among the variables testing for our economic hypotheses, we employ
conventional variables such as GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient.25
Unemployment, inflation, and GDP growth proxy economic uncertainty. The
business climate is taken into account by a country’s investment price level rel-
ative to that of the USA, proxying the returns to investments. We also employ
the share of public debt to GDP as a proxy for instability. Furthermore, we use
a composite index of access to modern technology to control for the potential
impact of new forms of communication and access to information.
In addition to standard proxies for globalization like openness to trade and
import tariffs, we employ the KOF index of globalization developed in Dreher
24 The measure of overall governance is the average of all six indices in Kaufmann et al. (2003),
covering voice and accountability, political stability, control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory
quality and government effectiveness. Although Kaufmann et al. (2003) argue for the opposite,
Bjørnskov (2005) shows that the six indices cannot be separated statistically and therefore all mea-
sure one underlying governance factor. Using the overall measure thus might capture effects that
any of the six subindices fail to sufficiently proxy for.
25 Note that the Gini coefficient does not necessarily measure relative income positions. However,
it is the best proxy available.
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Table 1 Variables used to test the hypotheses
Hypothesis Variable used Source
Political factors
1. Countries’ degree and age of
democracy increases life satis-
faction of their citizens.
Gastil Index, distributed from 1
(full political rights) to 7 (no
political rights); Polity IV Index
of Democracy, distributed from
0 (no rights) to 10 (full rights);
the number of years a country
is a democracy measured by the
number of years they have con-
secutively had full political rights.
Freedom House (2005),
Marshall and Jaggers (2003)
2. A history of independence
is conducive to citizens’ well-
being
The number of years a country
has been independent CIA (2005)
3. Right-wing political ideol-
ogy is detrimental to life sat-
isfaction of the poor
Political ideology measuerd on a
scale from −1 (fully leftwing) to
1 (fully rightwing), either in 10-
year averages or by ideology of
the incumbent government at the
time of the survey
Bjørnskov (2005)
4/5. Fractionalization reduces/
increases well-being
Herfindahl index of the legis-
lature, measured from 0 (full
fractionalization) to 1 (one-party
state)
Beck et al. (2001)
6. Bicameralism decreases
well-being
Number of chambers in parlia-
ment
CIA (2005)
7. Citizens living inmonarchies
are more satisfied with their
lives
Dummy for countries with a
monarchy
CIA (2005)
8. People in post-communist
countries are less satisfied with
their lives
Dummy for countries with com-
munist past
CIA (2005)
Economic factors
9. GDP per capita increases
well-being
Natural logarithm of GDP per
capita measured in purchasing-
power adjusted US dollars
Heston et al. (2002)
10. Globalization increases
well-being
Sum of exports and imports in
percent of GDP; KOF index of
globalization; average import tar-
iff rate
World Bank (2005);
Dreher (2006a, 2006b);
Gwartney and Lawson (2002);
Heston et al. (2002)
11/12. Government consump-
tion increases/reduces well-
being
Government consumption in per-
cent of GDP, measured in inter-
national prices
Heston et al. (2002)
13/14. Inequality reduces/
increases well-being
Gini coefficient of gross income UNU (2005)
15/16. Redistribution reduces/
increases well-being
Transfers and subsidies in percent
of GDP; top marginal tax rate
Gwartney and Lawson (2002)
17. Access to technology
reduces well-being
Composite index of access to
modern technology measured as
the share of population with ac-
cess to mobile phones, internet
and cable TV
World Bank (2005)
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Table 1 continued
Hypothesis Variable used Source
18. Economic environments
with stable and moderate
growth increase well-being
Inflation rate; unemployment
rate; total GDP growth of the
last five years; variance of GDP
growth rate; public debt in per-
cent of GDP; investment price
level relative to that of the USA
Heston et al. (2002), World
Bank (2005)
Institutional factors
19. Good governance and high
quality of institutions increase
well-being
Overall governance, distributed
from −2.5 to 2.5 (optimal gover-
nance); quality of the legal sys-
tem and the quality of regula-
tions, distributed from 0 to 10
(optimal quality); press freedom
distributed from 1 (full freedom)
to 100 (no freedom); lack of cor-
ruption distributed from 0 (all-
pervasive corruption) to 10 (no
corruption)
Kaufmann et al. (2003),
Gwartney and Lawson (2002),
Transparency International
(2005)
20. Vertical and horizontal
trust increase well-being
Share of people stating that most
people can be trusted (social
trust); average confidence in par-
liament on a scale from 1 (full
confidence) to 4 (no confidence)
Inglehart et al. (2004)
21. Ethnic diversity decreases
well-being
Ethnic diversity, measured as the
probability that two random citi-
zens do not share ethnicity
Alesina et al. (2003)
22. Religion affects well-being Shares of Protestants, Catholics,
Orthodox, Hindi, Buddhists, and
Muslims in the population
CIA (2005), USDS (2005)
Human developmental/ cultural factors
23. Health (care) increases
well-being
Life Expectancy in years; infant
mortality; number of children per
fertile woman (“fertility”)
World Bank (2005)
24. Education increases well-
being
Enrollment rates in primary and
secondary schooling, in percent
of a generation; average IQ
Barro and Lee (1993)
25. Gender discrimination
reduces well-being
Ratio of girls to boys in primary
schools
Barro and Lee (1993)
26. A moderate climate is
conducive to life satisfaction
Average temperature in coun-
try’s capital city; latitude; longi-
tude
CIA (2005)
27. People in predominantly
English-speaking countries are
more satisfied with their lives
Dummy for countries with Eng-
lish as primary language
CIA (2005)
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(2006a,b).26 The index is based on a large number of variables that relate to the
three main dimensions of globalization—economic integration, political inte-
gration, and social integration. The individual variables have been combined
to form six groups: actual flows of trade and investment, restrictions of inter-
national transactions, variables measuring the degree of political integration,
variables quantifying the extent of personal contacts with people living in for-
eign countries, variables measuring trans-border flows of information, and a
proxy for cultural integration.27
As indicators of social capital, we include the share of people stating thatmost
other people can be trusted (a measure of so-called generalized trust, which is
horizontal), and a country’s average confidence in parliament on a scale from 1
(full confidence) to 4 (no confidence), a measure of so-called vertical trust.
Finally, besides the quality of public goods indicators, we employ the country
average IQ score in addition to standard school enrollment measures of educa-
tion. As ameasure of the quality of schooling, IQ averages probably capture the
extent to which the education system provides people with analytical skills, and
as such may provide a decent proxy for the quality of the educational system.28
Our econometric analysis comprises three steps: first—for the whole pop-
ulation—we derive a baseline model consisting of both individual and cross-
country aggregate variables that have been suggested in the previous literature.
Second, we add the remaining aggregate variables one by one to the model
for the whole sample and the various groups of gender, income and political
orientation. Third, we employ Extreme Bounds Analysis (as outlined below)
to test the robustness of the aggregate variables of the baseline model — again
for the full sample and the subpopulations. Given the structure of the data
we employ ordered probit regressions for both steps. Data are clustered at
the country level to avoid inflated significance levels of the aggregate variable
coefficients (Moulton 1990). Note that this also corrects the standard errors for
heteroscedasticity.
The individual-specific variables to be included in the baseline model are
selected according to the previous literature outlined in the introduction. We
use 54 variables controlling for income, age, gender, education, employment sta-
tus, family status, type of religion and religiosity, trust and political ideology. The
26 The index has recently been used to analyze the impact of globalization on various economic,
political and social outcomes. For example, Dreher (2006a) studies the impact on the size of gov-
ernment, Dreher (2006b) focuses on economic growth, Tsai (2007) examines human well-being,
Dreher and Gaston (2005) examine the impact on inequality, Bjørnskov (2006) studies the effects
on economic freedom, Bergh (2006) analyzes the impact on the welfare state, and Lamla (2005)
the impact on pollution. The data and detailed description is available at http://www.globalization-
index.org.
27 The correlation between standard openness measures and national income is about −0.7, but
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are consistently low, so there is no problem identifying effects
due to collinearity. The same potential worries apply to ourmeasures of governance, but VIFs again
reject that collinearity is a problem.
28 Intelligence might be to some extent inherited, i.e., a matter of genes. However, whether the
standard IQ tests primarily measure genetic dispositions or the quality and quantity of schooling is
a question on which we prefer to remain agnostic.
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aggregate variables to be included in the baselinemodel are selected employing
a general-to-specific procedure. We start with the most comprehensive model,
consisting of the micro- and macro-level variables most prominently suggested
in the previous literature—although we have included only those aggregate
variables that do not reduce the number of countries in our sample below
70. We then consecutively eliminate those variables with the lowest t-statistic,
which is standard procedure (see, e.g., Hendry 2001). However, all aggregate
variables—including those available for a small number of countries only—are
employed in our robustness tests.
In our empirical model, life satisfaction is a function of a vector M contain-
ing the aggregate and individual variables for person j that form our baseline
specification.More specifically, we determine the probability of observing a par-
ticular level of well-being by the probability that an underlying score is within
the range of two particular cut points ki−1 and ki for the estimated outcome i
(life satisfaction level i). This score is obtained by estimating a linear function
of the independent variables in M plus a random error u. As such, we estimate
the probability that individual j reports a level of life-satisfaction i.
Pr(outcome = i) = Pr(ki−1 < β ′M + u ≤ ki). (1)
We test the sensitivity of our results along two dimensions. First, we explore
the robustness of our baseline model to the choice of covariates. Clearly, one of
the main challenges in empirical analysis when there is no established bench-
mark is coming up with a reliable and robust model. To examine which explana-
tory variables are robustly related to our dependent variable, we add additional
aggregate variables one at the time to the baseline model and, more impor-
tantly, employ variants of the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as
suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992).
The EBA has been widely used in the economic growth literature.29 The
central difficulty in empirical research—which also applies to the present
paper—is that several different models may all seem reasonable given the data,
but yield different conclusions about the parameters of interest. As pointed out
by Temple (2000), presenting only the results of the model which is preferred
by the author(s) can be misleading. This problem is ameliorated by the EBA,
which can be exemplified as follows. Equations of the following general form
are estimated:
Pr(outcome = i) = Pr(ki−1 < β ′M + aF + γ ′Z + u ≤ ki), (2)
where Pr(outcome = i) is the dependent variable; M is a vector of ‘standard’
explanatory variables in our baseline model; F is the variable of interest; Z is
a vector of up to two possible additional explanatory macro variables, which
according to the literature may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an
29 See Sturm and de Haan (2005) for further discussion.
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error term.30 Thus, in the EBA one variable at a time enters the F-vector, with
up to two other variables entering the regression in all possible combinations
(Z-vector) in addition to the variables of the baseline model (M-vector). In
total, given the sample size in this paper, each result of the EBA is based on
more than 800 regressions. As all variables in the Z-vector enter in all possible
combinations, the EBA has the major advantage that it circumvents the trade-
off between including as many observations as possible and covering a wide
range of explanatory variables faced by conventional regression analysis in the
presence of incomplete data.
Traditionally, the extreme bounds test for variable F states that if the lower
extreme bound for β—i.e., the lowest value for β minus two standard devia-
tions—is negative, while the upper extreme bound for β—i.e., the highest value
for β plus two standard deviations — is positive, the variable F is not robustly
related to the dependent variable. A robust relation, however, is present when
the upper and the lower bounds are at the same side of zero.
As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say
with certainty that onemodel dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions.
In these circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how sensi-
tive the findings are to alternativemodeling choices. Traditionally, the upper and
lower bounds of β obtained by the EBA as described above provide a relatively
simple criterion for such a test. Sala-i-Martin (1997), however, argues that this
test often poses too rigid a threshold: if the distribution of β has some positive
and some negative support, then one is bound to find at least one regression for
which the estimated coefficient changes sign if a sufficient number of regressions
are run. For this reason, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) suggestion to analyze
the entire distribution of estimates, in particular the unweighted cumulative
distribution function CDF(0), i.e., the fraction of the cumulative distribution
function lying on one side of zero. In addition, we also report the percentage of
the regressions in which the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the
5% level, along with the unweighted parameter estimate of β and its standard
deviation. In this paper, we will base our conclusions regarding the robustness
of variables on the Sala-i-Martin variant of the EBA.31
In what follows, we turn to the description of the results of our empirical
analysis.
30 Inclusion of up to two variables is in line with the EBA literature, although Levine and Renelt
propose three variables instead. However, given the huge dataset underlying our analysis, available
computational power does not allow performing these regressions in reasonable time. In any case,
restricting the vector Z to two variables is unlikely to change the results when the base model
consists of a substantial number of aggregate and individual control variables, as is the case here.
31 Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the (integrated) likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0).
However, the varying number of observations in the regressions due tomissing observations in some
of the variables poses a problem. Sturm and de Haan (2001) show that as a result this goodness of
fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and the
weights constructed in this way are not equivariant for linear transformations in the dependent var-
iable. Hence, changing scales will result in rather different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore
restrict our attention to the unweighted version.
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4 Empirical results
Table 2 presents the coefficients, significance levels and marginal effects for
the individual level variable specification and the reduced model (the M-vec-
tor). The first column is based on 78 countries, while the second regression
refers to 70 countries. As can be seen, in both models most of the individual
determinants of well-being are significant at conventional levels, with coeffi-
cients confirming the results of the previous literature. Specifically, well-being
is significantly affected by gender, age, tertiary education, income, occupational
status, marital status and family type, religion, frequency of service attendance,
generalized trust, confidence in national parliament, and political ideology of
the respondents. Note that we keep the insignificant individual variables in our
baseline model; however, their exclusion does not change the results.
As the second column of Table 2 shows, eight aggregate determinants of
well-being are chosen by the general-to-specific step-by-step elimination (and
are thus significant at the ten percent level at least): infantmortality, the number
of years the country has been independent, the shares of Catholics and Protes-
tants in the population, having a bicameral political system, openness to trade,
the investment price level relative to the USA, and postcommunist past.32 As
such, the baseline model reflects effects of such diverse factors as health, reli-
gion, institutional characteristics, and purely economic effects. For selecting the
baseline model, in addition, we have also kept the regional dummies for Asia,
Latin America, the Middle East and Northern Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa
(with Europe and North America forming the base group).33
According to the results, well-being rises with economic openness, which is in
line with standard economic trade theory, but opposite to popular beliefs. The
result is thus in line with our hypothesis 10. Life satisfaction also increases with
higher relative investment prices (hypothesis 18) but is substantially lower in
countries with a communist past (hypothesis 8). The number of years a country
has been independent significantly decreases life satisfaction, contradicting our
hypothesis 1. Based on the aspiration level theory, independence might tem-
porarily raise people’s expected satisfaction because independence may con-
stitute a possibility to overturn an old system that people have been unhappy
with. However, with time passing people adapt and fall back to their pre-
change set points. Similarly, positive changes in the political systemmight induce
high expectations about positive personal future developments (e.g., a rising
32 In comparison to the first working paper version of this paper (Bjørnskov et al. 2005), in which
the baseline was based on aggregate variables only, the average level of social trust in society is
not significant. Most probably, its effect is proxied both by the level of generalized trust measured
at the individual level as well as by the religion variables. Equally, government consumption is not
significant when aggregate factors are combined with micro data. Overall, however, the variables
chosen as aggregate determinants of well-being here are pretty much in line with those reported to
be robust in the working paper version.
33 These dummies account for shared cultural and historical characteristics. Two of them, Latin
America and North Africa, are highly significant, while the remaining two are kept for reasons of
consistency, with all four dummies being jointly highly significant.
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Table 2 Determinants of life satisfaction, baseline model
Micro model Reduced model
Coefficient mfx Coefficient mfx
Individual level variables
Buddhist −0.110 −0.020 −0.057 −0.010
Muslim −0.489∗∗∗ −0.077 0.032 0.006
Catholic 0.012 0.002 −0.087∗∗ −0.015
Protestant −0.112 −0.021 −0.121∗ −0.020
Orthodox −0.627∗∗∗ −0.091 −0.230∗∗∗ −0.036
Other Christian denomination −0.475∗∗ −0.071 −0.130∗ −0.021
No denomination −0.176∗∗ −0.033 −0.096∗∗ −0.016
Jewish −0.511∗∗∗ −0.073 −0.172∗∗ −0.027
Hindu −0.488∗∗∗ −0.071 0.036 0.006
Ideology missing −0.041 −0.008 0.0004 0.0001
Conservative ideology 0.140∗∗∗ 0.028 0.150∗∗∗ 0.027
Has confidence in parliament 0.047 0.009 0.101∗∗∗ 0.018
Trusts most people 0.174∗∗∗ 0.036 0.104∗∗∗ 0.019
Income level 2 0.099∗∗ 0.020 0.094∗∗∗ 0.017
Income level 3 0.133∗∗ 0.028 0.147∗∗∗ 0.028
Income level 4 0.269∗∗∗ 0.059 0.258∗∗∗ 0.051
Income level 5 0.339∗∗∗ 0.077 0.321∗∗∗ 0.065
Income level 6 0.468∗∗∗ 0.113 0.409∗∗∗ 0.087
Income level 7 0.550∗∗∗ 0.138 0.477∗∗∗ 0.106
Income level 8 0.574∗∗∗ 0.148 0.473∗∗∗ 0.106
Income level 9 0.649∗∗∗ 0.174 0.515∗∗∗ 0.119
Income level 10 (highest) 0.735∗∗∗ 0.203 0.559∗∗∗ 0.132
Age 25–34 −0.092∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.134∗∗∗ −0.022
Age 35–44 −0.145∗∗∗ −0.027 −0.212∗∗∗ −0.034
Age 45–54 −0.170∗∗∗ −0.031 −0.269∗∗∗ −0.042
Age 55–64 −0.076∗ −0.014 −0.168∗∗∗ −0.027
Age > 64 0.106∗ 0.022 −0.042 −0.007
Male −0.039∗∗ −0.008 −0.047∗∗∗ −0.008
Completed primary education 0.021 0.004 0.016 0.003
Incomplete sec., techn. 0.071 0.014 0.068 0.012
Complete sec., techn. −0.032 −0.006 0.015 0.003
Incomplete sec., uni prep 0.062 0.013 0.016 0.003
Complete sec., uni prep −0.033 −0.006 0.043 0.008
Lower-level tertiary edu 0.107 0.022 0.016 0.003
Upper-level tertiary edu 0.020 0.004 0.080∗ 0.015
Single female −0.151∗∗∗ −0.027 −0.042 −0.007
Single male −0.139∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.059 −0.010
Married 0.053∗ 0.010 0.157∗∗∗ 0.027
Cohabiting 0.138∗∗ 0.029 0.182∗∗∗ 0.036
Has had 1 child −0.067∗∗ −0.013 −0.055∗∗ −0.009
Has had 2 children −0.052∗ −0.010 −0.037 −0.006
Has had 3 or more children −0.022 −0.004 −0.017 −0.003
Selfemployed −0.062 −0.012 −0.020 −0.003
Housewife 0.094∗ 0.019 0.011 0.002
Retired −0.056 −0.011 −0.048 −0.008
Other −0.139∗∗ −0.025 −0.034 −0.006
Student −0.001 −0.0002 0.032 0.006
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Table 2 continued
Micro model Reduced model
Coefficient mfx Coefficient mfx
Unemployed −0.310∗∗∗ −0.052 −0.258∗∗∗ −0.040
Service part.: > once a week 0.098 0.020 0.182∗∗∗ 0.035
Service part.: once a week 0.066 0.013 0.127∗∗∗ 0.024
Service part.: one a month 0.046 0.009 0.077∗∗∗ 0.014
Service part.: on common holy day −0.028 −0.005 0.075∗∗∗ 0.014
Service part.: on specific holy day −0.011 −0.002 0.053 0.010
Service part.: once a year 0.007 0.001 0.026 0.005
Service part.: less than once a year −0.046 −0.009 0.0003 0.0001
Believes in superior being 0.032 0.006 −0.014 −0.002
Aggregate variables
Infant mortality −0.006∗∗ −0.001
Years of independence −0.0001∗∗ −0.00002
Share of Catholics 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
Share of Protestants 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
Bicameral system 0.080∗ 0.014
Openness 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002
Investment price 0.420∗∗∗ 0.074
Postcommuist −0.285∗∗∗ −0.047
Asia −0.059 −0.010
Latin America 0.295∗∗∗ 0.059
Africa −0.319 −0.047
Middle East and North Africa −0.303∗∗ −0.045
Observations 96092 87748
Countries 78 70
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.06
Note: Ordered probit regression with clustering at the country level. mfx shows marginal effects
evaluated at the means of the independent variables
* denotes significant at 10% level;
** significant at 5% level;
*** significant at 1% level
income trajectory), which—when the societal and personal costs of such a
change become eminent—are (partly or fully) disappointed.
A bicameral parliament is also associated with higher levels of life satis-
faction (contradicting hypothesis 6). Bicameral systems provide veto options
which help sustain the status quo and block political and social reforms (‘sta-
tus quo bias’). Obviously, individuals at large disfavor change and prefer stable
political and economic situations.34 Life satisfaction decreases with higher rates
of infant mortality, a measure of public health (hypothesis 23). The results of
the baseline model equally show that religious denominations are important
for well-being, with the share of Protestants and Catholics being significantly
associated with higher self-reported individual life satisfaction. As a possible
34 “For the initiator [of a new system] has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation
of the old institution and merely lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the new ones,”
Machiavelli, The Prince, 1513, cited in Feinberg (2006).
Cross-country determinants of life satisfaction 139
interpretation of this result, dominating religions in society shape an individual’s
assessments, perceptions and expectations of life satisfaction. Similarly, people
living in Latin America are significantly happier, while persons in the Middle
East and North Africa report systematically lower satisfaction with their lives.
The geographical variables are jointly significant at the one percent level.
Regarding the quantitative impact of the aggregate variables, the marginal
effects (“mfx”) evaluated at themeans of the independent variables show that a
communist past reduces the probability of reporting the highest life satisfaction
level by 5 percentage points. An increase in the relative investment price level
by one point increases satisfaction by 0.07. A second chamber also exerts a
strong impact while the remaining marginal effects are comparably small. One
additional year of independence reduces well-being by −0.00002. Hence, 2000
years of independence would lead to a decrease in the probability of reporting
the highest satisfaction category by just 0.04 percentage points.
Finally, comparing the full set of aggregate variables listed in Table 1 with
the resulting baseline model in Table 2 shows that many variables suggested to
be important determinants of life satisfaction in the previous literature do not
survive the general-to-specific procedure. In particular, a set of welfare state
characteristics—some of them strongly advocated by Layard (2006), e.g.,—
such as gender equality, education, transfer payments, and progressivity of the
tax system, but also other macro-level variables like government consump-
tion, national income, income inequality, unemployment, and inflation, as well
as institutional characteristics of modern states—democracy and good gover-
nance—fail to be significant according to this exercise.
The remainder of this section is organized according to the groups of vari-
ables introducedabove.We startwith discussing the impact of political variables.
Economic, institutional, and cultural/human developmental determinants fol-
low. The effects of all these determinants are analyzed for the whole sample
and the subpopulations.
In each of the output tables which follow, we report for each variable the
coefficient, significance level and the corresponding marginal effect in the
ordered probit regression (columns 1 and 2). Regarding the EBA, we pres-
ent the results for the one variable that enters the F-vector for the robustness
test by varying two out of 42 other aggregate variables in the Z-vector, finally
generating 800 regressions for each determinant. The reported statistics
include the lower and upper bound for the tested variable (columns 3 and
4), the percentage of significant coefficients for the variable of interest in these
800 regressions (at the 5% level) (column 5), the percentage of the cumulative
distribution function lying on one side of zero (CDF(0)) (column 6), and, finally
the average beta coefficient of the tested variable and the average of the cor-
responding standard deviation (columns 7 and 8). These statistics are reported
not only for the additional variables entering the model one at the time (F), but
also for all variables in the baseline model (M).
The quantitative values of the beta coefficients and their standard deviations
have to be interpretedwith caution, as they refer to all (converging) regressions,
including those resulting in insignificant coefficients also. Still, it is instructive to
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compare these coefficients with those of the individual regression results. The
final assessment will be based on the CDF(0). Following Sala-i-Martin (1997),
a variable is considered to be robust if the CDF(0) exceeds 0.90.
4.1 Political variables
Table 3 presents the results for the political variables. As can be seen, for the full
sample, the impact of the three political baseline variables is clearly confirmed
by the EBA. The CDF(0) of bicameral parliaments, years of independence,
and postcommunism clearly exceeds 0.90, with average beta coefficients cor-
responding to the individual estimates. Equally important for the validity of
the general-to-specific results, both the EBA and the individual ordered probit
regressions show that all other potential aggregate political determinants do
not pass the robustness test and are thus correctly excluded from the baseline
model.
Turning to the empirical results for the sub-samples by income, gender or
political orientation, Table 3 clearly shows that there are some differences in the
political determinants of life satisfaction between the various societal groups
across countries. However, the results also show that the baseline model fits
the data very well for all groups. With only one exception, our three baseline
variables pass the robustness test. The exception is the high income group,
where only the post communist dummy is robustly (and negatively) related
to well-being. Possibly, people with high income can insure themselves against
potential economic shocks that usually parallel fights for independence and
political reforms. Furthermore, social elites tend to ‘survive’ changes in the
political system and are thus comparably less affected than other social groups
whose relative socio-economic position is more unstable.
Regarding our subsamples, formen andwomen, aswell as peoplewithmiddle
and high income, the additional political variables remain insignificant. How-
ever, there are four exceptions: First, people with left-wing ideology are happier
in older democracies (‘democratic legacy’). Second, people with right-wing ide-
ology are less happy in monarchies, while they are, third, happier with more
fractionalized governments. The latter is also true, fourth, for people with low
income. As one explanation, fractionalized governments aremore likely to pur-
sue pro-poor policies as parties have to compete harder for the median voter,
so such governments are less likely to engage in strongly ideological policies.
Alternatively, fractionalized governments might induce some political stability
by being less able to make sweeping reforms.
Turning to the marginal effects of the political variables on life satisfaction,
the results show that the impact of years of independence is of similar small
magnitude across the subsamples. Living in a postcommunist country is det-
rimental to life satisfaction to all societal groups, but the effect appears to be
larger for women and people with low and middle income, and smaller for
people with high income. It might well be that these three groups are those
which had originally most profited from the communist ideology of an equal
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share of the ‘cake’ for all societal groups, while high income earners are possibly
those with the strongest comparative advantage in an open market society.
The marginal effects also indicate that the impact of bicameral systems is
particularly strong for persons in the lower income group. Possibly, policies
in certain countries in the late 1990s35 which particularly entailed cuts in the
welfare and pension system might have occurred to a lesser extent in countries
with a strong institutional veto player, favoring the status quo and thus favoring
people with low income.While this may simply be due to this income group val-
uing stability higher due to fluctuations having larger relative impacts on them,
it may also partly stem from historical institutional differences as many bicam-
eral systems were supplanted by the British colonial administration, which was
known to be more lenient than that of other countries (cf. Ferguson 2004).
As stated before, according to the results,most of the additional political vari-
ables are clearly not robustly related towell-being in any of our sub-samples. For
example, variousmeasures of democratic institutions such as democratic legacy,
the Gastil index and the Polity IV index, exert no significant effect on individ-
ual life satisfaction. The importance of this finding should not be understated
as there is an ongoing dispute on whether or not democracy affects individual
well-being (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Dorn et al. 2006). Similarly, governments’
political ideologies do not appear to be influential, which might indicate that,
in general, ideology and its induced policy changes are in line with the average
citizen’s preferences, both in the short-run (‘current political ideology’) as well
as over a time span of ten years (‘political ideology, 10-year’). This result con-
firms the finding of Bjørnskov et al. (2007), in which government ideology was
only important in its interplay with government spending, but not on its own.
4.2 Economic factors
Table 4 presents the results for the economic factors. As can be seen from col-
umns 1 and 6 in the table, the two baseline variables are robustly related to
life satisfaction in the full sample and all subgroups—openness to trade and
the investment price level clearly increase well-being. Also, the coefficients of
the variables obtained from the individual regressions again closely match the
average coefficients based on the more than 800 regressions of the EBA. The
results show that a higher investment price—indicating a ‘friendly’ business
climate—is beneficial for all societal groups, but, as the marginal effect shows,
left-wing voters enjoy the highest gains, closely followed by people with middle
income.
Turning to the additional economic variables, only two of them pass the
robustness test in the full sample. According to the results of the EBA, well-
being robustly increases with higher subsidies and higher marginal tax rates,
lending support to our hypothesis 14 according to which redistribution is con-
35 The surveys were carried out in 1996–1997 for some countries, but for most of the countries in
1999–2000.
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ducive to life satisfaction. The same pattern prevails in the female, left, and
middle income samples, while subsidies also robustly increase the well-being of
male and right-wing people.As one explanation, obviously, particularly women,
people with middle income and left-wing voters appear to be in favor of in-
come redistribution through the tax system, whichmight represent those groups
whose income is more subject to fluctuations. Subsidizing the domestic industry
might well help to create and maintain those jobs that are usually mostly occu-
pied by middle income earners (reflecting an average level of education), but
does not significantly affect employment opportunities of low skilled and very
highly skilled workers, represented by the corresponding income groups. The
positive impact of subsidies on right-wing voters is noteworthy given the fact
that strong government involvement is commonly associated with a typically
leftist view. Themarginal effects imply that actual subsidy levels aremore in line
with conservative voters’ preferences, but possibly too low to exert a decisively
beneficial impact on leftist-oriented persons.
Higher per capita GDP robustly increases life satisfaction in the left-wing
and right-wing samples, potentially proxying greater consumption possibilities
(in line with hypothesis 9). In contrast, more government consumption robustly
decreases life satisfaction in the left-wing and right-wing samples and the low
and middle income groups. The detrimental influence of government consump-
tion supports previous findings reported in Bjørnskov et al. (2007) and lends
support to hypothesis 12.36 Themarginal effects, however, imply that right-wing
voters are twice as negatively affected by government spending compared to
left-wing voters, which supports the traditional view that government interven-
tions are more favored by leftist ideologies.37 As regards personal income, it
is possible that people with high incomes are systematically less affected by
government consumption decisions because a relatively larger share of their
income remains when subtracting fixed costs of housing, food, etc.
In the left-wing sample solely, moreover, people report robustly greater sat-
isfaction with their lives with lower unemployment and better access to technol-
ogy.While the result for unemployment is intuitive and in support of hypothesis
18, easier access to modern technology might to some extent proxy economic
development and prosperity. The result would thus correspond to the positive
effect of GDP per capita for the identical population group, but equally mirror
the impact of unemployment and large-scale redistribution via subsidies and
the tax system, which left-wing voters arguably caremore about than right-wing
voters.
People in the right-wing sample are similarly unhappy with rising unem-
ployment, while their well-being increases with greater globalization. Thus
36 This result might be due to reverse causality, as ‘unhappier’ countries having greater problems
might require larger government sectors. Bjørnskov et al. (2007) test for reversed causality and find
this to be no significant problem.
37 In contrast, right-wing government ideology mitigates the detrimental impact of government
consumption spending (Bjørnskov et al. 2007). This result shows the importance of distinguishing
between individual ideology and government ideology, which would be suppressed in a purely
aggregate analysis.
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right-wing oriented persons appear more satisfied with their lives in econo-
mies which are more exposed to globalization than in more isolated countries,
an effect going beyond that of openness to trade. Arguably, people with more
left-wing ideology might frequently be more in favor of restrictions and fear
more globalization to come at the expense of social peace through its impacts
on social welfare and wage distribution. For right-wing persons, the marginal
effects of the unemployment rate are twice as large as those for the left-wing
group. Unemployment rates (as ameasure of business climate) might well serve
as a performance indicator of the ruling government, particularly in econom-
ically difficult times, and the smaller effect in the left-wing group might be
caused by the fact that the value system of right-wing voters implies a greater
importance of unemployment rates relative to, e.g., distributional concerns.
Finally, public debt reduces well-being of high income people solely, which
may reflect that this income group is unlikely to gain from the public activities
financed by debt accumulation while bearing major parts of the (tax) burden
coming with repayment. Surprisingly, economic growth reduces well-being of
people with middle income.
Among those economic determinants not robustly related to life satisfaction
in any sample are the average tariff rate, inflation, growth stability, and income
inequality. The first factor might be well disguised by the openness to trade
measure, while the insignificance of income inequality might well indicate that
people care less about the resulting income distribution in society than actual
efforts by the government to redistribute, although often constituting only some
type of symbolic policy-making.38 Furthermore, it might well be that not a suffi-
ciently large number of countries suffer from inflation or growth instability
sufficiently high to impact subjective well-being significantly.
4.3 Institutional factors
Results for institutional factors are reported in Table 5. The shares of Protes-
tants andCatholics robustly increase well-being in all samples, with a coefficient
significant at the 1% level (column 1) and a CDF of 1 in all cases. Again, the
positive coefficients of the individual regressions correspond closely to the
average coefficient, ranging between 0.003 and 0.005. The marginal effects for
both religion variables are similar across regressions, showing all groups to be
qualitatively equally affected.
In contrast, most of the additional institutional variables do not exhibit a
robust and significant impact on well-being. The major exceptions are the mea-
sures of governance and a few religious denominations in some population
groups. In particular, legal quality, regulatory quality, and overall governance
negatively impactwell-beingwith aCDF(0)> 0.9 in some samples. These results
are rather surprising, contradicting our hypothesis 19. In particular, people with
38 For example, the top marginal tax rate on companies is rarely applied in some countries, and
individual high income earners sometimes enjoy a lot of possibilities to substantially reduce their
taxable income.
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high income suffer from better governance; in the full sample, men and people
with middle and high income are worse off with better legal quality. Moreover,
better regulatory quality robustly decreases well-being of people with low and
middle incomes. In an attempt to explain the latter, more intrusive regulations
of the business sector and labor market might be detrimental to life satisfac-
tion of people with lower and middle income. However, these puzzling results
clearly need further research (which is beyond the scope of this paper).
Turning to religion, the results show that there is some significant impact of
having a large group of a particular denomination in society on some groups.
This result is particularly noteworthy as we have already controlled for indi-
vidual religious denominations and included regional dummies in our regres-
sions.39 For this reason, at the societal level it is probably more suitable to think
of these as ‘aggregate religious denominations’ in the form of specific ‘cultural
traits and norms’ generated by the share of persons linked to a particular reli-
gious tradition. For example, the share of Buddhists is detrimental to the life
satisfaction of men only, but not in any other sample. Thus, it might well be that
the negative impact of Buddhist culture on men compared to that on women
reflects a gender bias in the Buddhist value system: those virtues in this life
whose fulfillment determine the type of the next incarnation differ between
genders as men appear to be significantly more burdened than women.40 More-
over, a stronger influence of Muslim tradition appears conducive to females
and left-wing voters. In Islam as in all Judeo-Christian traditions, single persons
are called to contribute to a fair income distribution in society and as such,
these religions favor allocations closer to the preferences of left-wing voters
and financially less secured women.41 With respect to the detrimental effects
of large Orthodox populations on left-wing voters, this may simply reflect that
predominantly Orthodox Eastern European countries tend to have progressed
more slowly in their transition from communism compared to the postcommu-
nist countries which formed part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire until the
end of World War I.
Finally, ethnic diversity is associated with rising life satisfaction for persons
with middle income, and those with a right-wing ideology, and does thus not
seem to increase the type of conflicts associatedwith well-being (hypothesis 21).
Contrary to expectations, insignificant determinants of life satisfaction
throughout all subgroups are formal institutional rules such as press freedom,
but also informal ones like the lack of corruption and the share of Hindi in
39 Again, a similar finding was reported in Bjørnskov et al. (2005) for both Hindi and Muslim
groups, but, in general, with significances more often observed also in the other income or ide-
ology groups. This analysis, however, was solely based on aggregate determinants of average life
satisfaction.
40 For more information on Buddhism, see Encyclopaedia Britannica orWikipedia at http://en.wi-
kipedia.org/wiki/ Buddhism (27/09/2005).
41 Islamic philosophy, in principle, still does not permit levying interest on money (‘usury’), as it
was the case until the late Middle Ages in Europe. In addition, the Old Testament already sets
explicit rules for income redistribution measures (e.g., communal support of widows, remission of
debt, release of slaves, etc.).
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the population. Also the social capital indicators, confidence in parliament and
generalized trust among citizens, turn out to be not robustly related to life
satisfaction. The reason might be that the latter two factors have been taken
into account at the individual level, where both are highly significant, while the
share of Hindi most probably coincides too strongly with the individual-level
religion measures due to its low world-wide promulgation.
4.4 Human development and culture
Table 6 presents the results for human development and cultural factors. As
can be seen, infant mortality—our only baseline variable in this category—is
extremely robust in all samples, and itsmarginal impact is comparably big across
groups. Again, the average beta resulting from the EBA is quite similar to the
coefficient obtained in the ordered probit regressions. As in the full sample,
higher infant mortality is detrimental to individual life satisfaction among all
subgroups (supporting hypothesis 23).
The results also show that few of the additional variables robustly affect
well-being. One exception is primary schooling, robustly increasing well-being
in the full sample; the same is true for men, women, right-wing voters and
the middle-income group. Although these findings are in line with hypothesis
24, the insignificance in the low income group might indicate that people with
some education compare their social position with those earningmore, prevent-
ing them from deriving satisfaction from their education. Secondary schooling,
on the other hand, does not contribute to life satisfaction in any group, while
average IQ even reduces satisfaction in the left-wing and lower income group.
This finding contradicts hypothesis 24 and might support an alternative ‘happy
ignorance’ hypothesis.
Consistent with previous cross-country findings in Bjørnskov et al. (2006),
our results also show negative effects of gender equality. However, gender
equality exerts a robust impact in only two of the samples, namely for left- and
right-wing voters, indicating that gender equality may only matter for people
with sufficient political interest to hold clear political opinions. The equality of
the marginal effects indicates that both groups are equally negatively affected,
independent of their political orientation.
Finally, we find robust effects of geography on life satisfaction. Both latitude
and longitude are robust determinants of well-being in some of the samples.
Specifically, men, right-wing voters and the lower income group are less satisfied
when residing in countries which are located farther away from the equator in
either direction—and the same is true for the full sample. In interpreting this
result, it might be useful to note that those countries with the highest latitude
(maximum: 90˚) are the Middle- and Northern European countries (except
for Canada and partly Russia where only small populations live in the north-
ern-most regions), while African and South-American states have the smallest
values. Thus, this finding contradicts hypothesis 27, stating people in moderate
climates to be more satisfied with their lives. Latitude therefore rather seems to
inversely proxy the North-South division of the world, and thus trade patterns,
160 C. Bjørnskov et al.
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economic development, and quality of political institutions (which we cannot
fully control for). In contrast, individuals with low and high incomes and right-
wing voters are more satisfied in countries located on a higher longitude; the
farther away the country from the zero meridian in Greenwich (UK) either in
the Eastern or Western direction up to 180˚, the better off feel its citizens.
Other factors suggested as important determinants of well-being in the pre-
vious literature turn out to be not robustly related to life satisfaction. In particu-
lar, our results thus clearly contradict that life expectancy, fertility, and average
temperature determine well-being. In addition, we find the coefficient of the
English language dummy not to be robustly related to well-being, contradicting
Dorn et al. (2006).
5 Summary of results and discussion
Our findings support a number of results previously reported in the empirical
literature on life satisfaction as well as neoclassical and public choice theory,
while refuting others. First of all, following a general-to-specific analysis, our
baseline specification of aggregate variables comes to consist of openness to
trade, relative investment price levels, infant mortality, the number of years
a country has been independent, the shares of Protestants and Catholics in
populations, having a bicameral political system, and communist past. While
our Extreme Bounds Analysis shows that these baseline variables are in most
cases robustly related to life satisfaction of individuals in all groups investigated
here, we find some differences in the magnitude with which these factors influ-
ence subjective well-being among the groups divided along income, gender and
political conviction. While the influence of openness, higher investment prices,
infant mortality and communist past is in line with our hypotheses, this is not
true for history of independence and bicameralism. Religious cultural traits
positively impact well-being.
We tested a large set of additional macro-level variables that have been
suggested to affect life satisfaction in the previous happiness literature. We
grouped these variables into the four broad categories of economic, political,
and institutional variables, and determinants relating to human development
and culture. Among the political factors, we observe people with high income to
be least affected by the detrimental effects of stark political changes. Further-
more, government fractionalization raises the well-being of right-wing voters
and people with low income. Democratic institutions are usually not directly
important for well-being, but do affect life satisfaction of persons with either
left-wing or right-wing ideology via democratic legacy or monarchy.
Among the economic variables, the additional factors are spread unevenly
across different groups in society. To mention the most important results, we
find that peoplewith clearly stated political convictions—left-wing or right-wing
ideology—suffer from high government consumption, low national income and
high unemployment, while these variables are not robustly related to well-being
in the full sample. Redistributive government activities increase life satisfaction
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in the full sample and in those subpopulations which traditionally belong to the
deprived or favor such policy because of their political conviction. Subsidies,
however, work similarly beneficial for these groups, but also increase well-
being of further subpopulations, including men and right-wing voters. There
are additional beneficial influences of globalization on right-wing persons and
deleterious ones of public debt on people with high income (who might expect
having to pay higher taxes in the future).
Regarding institutional factors, we observe that, overall, governance is neg-
atively associated with life satisfaction—contradicting our expectations and the
previous literature. We have no consistent and comprehensive explanation for
this. Also contrary to popular beliefs in many countries, we find that ethnic
diversity increases well-being in the right-wing and middle income samples,
while stronger Buddhist traits in society are detrimental to male life satisfac-
tion. Islamic tradition, however, is conducive to the well-being of women and
left-wing voters, probably resulting from the pro-income redistribution philos-
ophy of Islam.
Finally, among the various human development indicators included in the
analysis, enrollment in primary schools robustly increases life satisfaction of
men and women, right-wing voters and middle income earners alike, but—sur-
prisingly—not that of people with low income. The national average score in
standardized intelligence tests (IQ), however, turns out to have a significantly
negative effect on life satisfaction for left-wing voters and people with low
income. We also find that gender equality reduces well-being of those who are
interested in politicalmatters only, while some effects observed for geographical
factors are less intuitive.
As such, the results hold broad and rather complex implications for the the-
ory of life satisfaction as most effects can be attributed to several categories.
The first category, pertaining to a better match of supplied goods to consumers’
preferences, comprises openness to trade, government spending, globalization,
public debt, and national income. The strong positive association between life
satisfaction and openness to trade and its negative association with the govern-
ment’s share of total income for some groups both point in the same direction.
When governments spend relatively more of national income, the share within
the control of individuals necessarily decreases. Moreover, state-owned enter-
prises, in which some of this income is generated, are subject to political demand
and control, and less to market demand than private enterprises, implying that
publicly produced private goods may tend to be less aligned with the prefer-
ences of consumers than those produced privately. The same argument holds
for higher public debt which reduces the financial means available at the discre-
tion of the politicians or implies higher future taxes. Similarly, higher national
income reflects the more relaxed budget constraint of both government and
individuals alike—an explanation supported by our finding that income is very
robust in the two subsamples by political conviction, but not in any other group
where a substantial part have no clearly stated political convictions. The same
main conclusion, but with the opposite sign, applies to openness to trade and
globalization. New economic trade theory stresses the non-pecuniary benefits
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of globalization, leading to welfare improvements through an increase in the
variety of goods, which makes it easier for individuals to fit their consumption
to their own preferences. The overall implication thus seems to be that the
quality of individual consumption and individuals’ control over its composition
in particular matter for life satisfaction.
A second category of variables important for perceived well-being comprises
government activities that may affect individuals’ relative status in society. Sub-
sidies and higher marginal tax rates both exert positive and robust influences on
people withmiddle income, comprising those peoplemost likely to benefit from
these factors in relative terms. As such, even if subsidies and tax progressivity
are often thought to be detrimental to the national economy as a whole, the
‘middle class’ is probably made better off when compared to other segments
of society. The same may apply to access to general schooling, which exerts a
positive influence on roughly the same groups in society in the form of primary
schooling enrollment.
The institutional influences also point in opposite and somewhat confus-
ing directions. For the detrimental effects of communist past and the number
of years a country has been independent, our explanation was based on the
non-fulfillment of exaggerated expectations and the adoption to pre-change set
points after gaining independence. An additional explanation consistent with
anecdotal evidence suggests that both former communist and very long-estab-
lished countries tend to be shaped by rather hierarchical and sclerotic social
structures, reducing social mobility. In other words, both measures may capture
the perceived inability of individuals to move up in the social hierarchy through
their own doing, which thus entails a substantial loss of personal control. On
the other hand, the negative and robust effects of other governance measures
are truly puzzling. We cannot offer any consistent and comprehensive expla-
nations, but have to point to this topic as an area that needs further research,
in particular since such measures have been shown to strongly and positively
affect economic growth and stability.
6 Conclusions
The literature on cross-country determinants of life satisfaction has generated
a large number of factors that supposedly affect individual satisfaction with life
across countries. In this paper, we have employed Extreme Bounds Analysis
to test whether a number of these macro factors do robustly influence life sat-
isfaction; that is, whether the findings of previous studies survive a sensitivity
test regularly applied in recent empirical work. As a second robustness test
applied in this paper, we split the national samples in three ways, enabling us
to compare the impacts of the factors on the lower, middle, and upper third of
the personal income distributions, men and women separately, and voters to
the left and right of the national political middle. This allows us to obtain more
accurate estimates of diverse factors whenever they have differential impacts
on separate groups in society.
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According to our results, only some of the potential aggregate determinants
of life satisfaction proposed in the previous literature survive our robustness
tests. First, from a social as well as a political point of view, it seems comforting
to find that a set of cross-national factors appears to constitute a baseline speci-
fication that is common to all groups in society. Yet, we also tested a large set of
additional factors that might potentially affect life satisfaction. Among them,
however, none is robustly related to well-being both among the subpopulations
and the whole population, while a number of variables that are robustly related
to life satisfaction in specific subgroups in society are not robust predictors of
others.
Our results from in depth robustness analysis of the overall population, how-
ever, do not confirm the impact of the majority of the variables suggested in
previous studies. Among them are, e.g., national income, welfare state charac-
teristics, democracy, unemployment rates, and higher education—all of which
have previously been presented as significant predictors of satisfaction. This
clearly shows that it is not sufficient to report those results that authors prefer
but to take the robustness to the inclusion of additional variable properly into
account. Our results equally stress the need for more statistical care in this lit-
erature. Ideally, systematic analysis like the one presented here—also including
analyses by social subgroups—could complement the results to give the reader
some sense of the robustness of the findings reported.
As a last comment, it must be stressed that we have not considered differ-
ential impacts of any variable across characteristics that pertain to countries.
As such, all factors are assumed to have the same impact on specific societal
groups across countries, which may not be a natural assumption. Given that
our source of the life satisfaction data—the World Values Survey—tends to
over-represent developed countries, it remains an open question whether our
results would change if the sample would be restricted to relatively poor coun-
tries. However, such exercises must await the collection of representative data
for a sufficient number of developing countries. While our work thus stresses
the overriding importance of exploring the robustness of empirical findings, an
important question for future research is therefore whether factors have heter-
ogeneous impacts across countries, depending on their specific social, cultural,
political and economic characteristics.
Appendix A Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Life satisfaction 87748 6.477 2.602 1 10
Baseline model—Individual level variables
Buddhist 87748 0.013 0.113 0 1
Muslim 87748 0.188 0.391 0 1
Catholic 87748 0.331 0.471 0 1
Protestant 87748 0.011 0.104 0 1
Orthodox 87748 0.071 0.257 0 1
other Christian denomination 87748 0.027 0.163 0 1
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Appendix A continued
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
no denomination 87748 0.178 0.383 0 1
Jewish 87748 0.004 0.061 0 1
Hindu 87748 0.019 0.137 0 1
ideology missing 87748 0.269 0.444 0 1
conservative ideology 87748 0.333 0.471 0 1
has confidence in parliament 87748 0.372 0.483 0 1
trusts most people 87748 0.268 0.443 0 1
Income level 2 87748 0.142 0.349 0 1
Income level 3 87748 0.149 0.356 0 1
Income level 4 87748 0.157 0.364 0 1
Income level 5 87748 0.131 0.338 0 1
Income level 6 87748 0.105 0.307 0 1
Income level 7 87748 0.082 0.274 0 1
Income level 8 87748 0.060 0.237 0 1
Income level 9 87748 0.040 0.197 0 1
Income level 10 (highest) 87748 0.040 0.196 0 1
Age 25–34 87748 0.238 0.426 0 1
Age 35–44 87748 0.216 0.411 0 1
Age 45–54 87748 0.161 0.367 0 1
Age 55–64 87748 0.111 0.314 0 1
Age >64 87748 0.104 0.306 0 1
Male 87748 0.487 0.500 0 1
Completed primary education 87748 0.154 0.361 0 1
Incomplete sec., techn. 87748 0.092 0.289 0 1
Complete sec., techn. 87748 0.143 0.351 0 1
Incomplete sec., uni prep 87748 0.104 0.305 0 1
Complete sec., uni prep 87748 0.176 0.381 0 1
Lower level tertiary edu 87748 0.082 0.275 0 1
Upper level tertiary edu 87748 0.129 0.335 0 1
Single female 87748 0.050 0.218 0 1
Single male 87748 0.013 0.112 0 1
Married 87748 0.567 0.496 0 1
Cohabiting 87748 0.039 0.194 0 1
Has had 1 child 87748 0.145 0.352 0 1
Has had 2 children 87748 0.253 0.435 0 1
Has had 3 or more children 87748 0.291 0.454 0 1
Selfemployed 87748 0.097 0.295 0 1
Housewife 87748 0.143 0.350 0 1
Retired 87748 0.130 0.336 0 1
Other 87748 0.020 0.140 0 1
Student 87748 0.069 0.253 0 1
Unemployed 87748 0.086 0.280 0 1
Service part.: > once a week 87748 0.125 0.331 0 1
Service part.: once a week 87748 0.189 0.392 0 1
Service part.: one a month 87748 0.119 0.324 0 1
Service part.: on common holy days 87748 0.161 0.367 0 1
Service part.: on specific holy days 87748 0.024 0.152 0 1
Service part.: once a year 87748 0.073 0.260 0 1
Service part.: less than once a year 87748 0.086 0.281 0 1
Believes in superior being 87748 0.777 0.417 0 1
Baseline model—aggregate variables
Bicameral parliament 87748 1.555 0.497 1 2
Years of independence 87748 231.701 400.037 10 2001
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Appendix A continued
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Postcommunism, dummy 87748 0.260 0.439 0 1
Openness to trade 87748 68.278 48.452 15.428 324.437
Investment price 87748 0.833 0.363 0.261 1.951
Protestants (%) 87748 30.012 38.051 0 98
Catholics (%) 87748 13.022 24.747 0 95
Infant mortality 87748 24.867 24.466 2.9 104
Asia 87748 0.129 0.335 0 1
Latin America 87748 0.171 0.377 0 1
Africa 87748 0.048 0.215 0 1
Middle East and North Africa 87748 0.133 0.340 0 1
Political factors
Government fractionalization 87748 0.712 0.216 0.247 1
Political ideology, 10-year 87748 0.074 0.475 −1 1
Political ideology, current 87748 0.004 0.442 −1 1
Democracy, Gastil index 87748 2.820 1.817 1 6
Democracy, Polity IV 87045 5.404 5.272 −7 10
Democratic legacy 87748 17.826 15.033 0 40
Monarchy 87748 0.169 0.375 0 1
Economic factors
Average tariff rate 79016 10.349 7.288 0 32.6
Income inequality 80408 3804.719 955.429 2150 6343
GDP per capita 87748 8.929 0.950 6.178 10.692
Government consumption 87748 17.560 9.188 5.228 49.881
Inflation 86933 16.077 31.012 −0.100 242.309
Unemployment 82441 9.577 5.472 1.08 33.4
Globalization index, 1995 79619 3.121 1.198 1.07 6.09
Compound growth, 5-years 83863 0.089 0.106 −0.163 0.484
Growth stability 79564 0.036 0.022 0.008 0.113
Subsidies 80150 43.682 18.857 2.818 74.181
Top marginal tax rate 79964 37.029 10.007 0 59
Public debt, % of GDP 78507 53.610 29.713 5 164.3
Access to technology 87748 144.298 148.999 0.444 499.466
Institutional factors
Governance 87748 0.247 0.972 −1.337 1.942
Legal quality 79016 6.327 2.050 2.35 9.62
Regulatory quality 79016 6.005 1.010 3.09 8.23
Lack of corruption 87748 4.640 2.446 1.5 9.7
Press freedom 87748 41.369 22.476 8 83
Confidence in parliament 86335 2.575 0.320 1.403 3.143
Ethnic diversity 87748 0.362 0.220 0.002 0.930
Orthodox (%) 87748 10.594 27.823 0 98
Muslims (%) 87748 13.149 28.497 0 99.8
Hindi (%) 87748 2.027 11.833 0 81.3
Buddhists (%) 87748 1.130 9.263 0 84
Social trust (%) 87748 26.939 13.842 4.752 65.349
Human development factors
Primary schooling 86335 103.283 11.784 63.260 162.296
Secondary schooling 84423 82.566 27.414 4.824 160.760
Average IQ 87748 91.760 8.207 66 106
Fertility 87748 3.016 1.417 1.435 6.973
Life expectancy 87748 71.492 7.967 38.961 81.563
Gender discrimination 83329 98.445 6.980 71.744 114.600
Average temperature 83655 14.290 6.284 4.2 27.2
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Appendix A continued
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Latitude 86806 34.798 17.439 1 65
Longitude 86806 49.729 39.403 2 174
English speaking 87748 0.106 0.308 0 1
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